34 With regard to the first strategy, deep accordalism has been defended. Positivism seems to be facing a dilemma regarding the reconstruction of social rules and the (well-known) problem of following them. The two horns of the dilemma imply that it cannot provide an accurate representation of the problem of disagreements. If we assert that a conventional rule is exhausted by explicit consent to its correct application, the theoretical differences are not comprehensible, because the lack of agreement implies that there is no answer by the rule; If we said that the agreement only extends to the texts that are important, we would have a very bad idea of the corresponding convention. On the other hand, Professor Bayon emphasizes the relevance of conformity in paradigmatic cases, which shows the presence of public criteria that are not limited to these applications.30 According to Bayon, recognition implies that there are paradigmatic cases that involve mastery of a technique. However, this requires only a tacit knowledge of the correct application criteria of the rule, which should not be transparent to everyone. A general agreement does not guarantee that the right answer has been found and the absence of an agreement does not necessarily mean that there is no correct answer. However, in addition to the difficulties in relying on the existence of a conventional answer despite differences of opinion, these views are bound to assert that differences of opinion are of the convention, which does not appear to be the case in many cases.31 54 Moreover, differences of opinion on validity criteria are not frequent and can be reported plausibly as marginal cases in which judges have discretion. compatible with the convergence needed for positivism. Moreover, if differences of opinion on the criteria were common within a community, we would have doubts as to whether it did have a legal system.41 We believe that this is a pathological practice that is not able to perform most of the functions that we usually relate to the law.
On the other hand, differences of opinion on sources can be reconstituted, either as empirical disagreements or at odds over the validity criteria.42 37 Disagreements are then understandable because individuals can discuss: a) what are the general and partial purposes of the system; b) what role different people play in achieving the goals; (c) how confidence in the system is distributed? (d) what levels of confidence are closest to different methods of interpretation; and (e) what interpretation methods are compatible with the objectives and distributions of the system. In these cases, divergences are genuine theoretical quarrels, which not only depend on the simple determination of the facts and meet the same principles that are usually applied to the development and evaluation of scientific theories.34 In this way, Shapiro`s reconstruction not only makes differences understandable, but also explains why they are as widespread as they are.